President Chavez and his public policies are seemingly revolutionary but ironic at best. The current Venezuelan political system as designed by President Chavez and the National Assembly is fated to encounter its demise much like the Punto Fijo Model. The regime change as orchestrated by the Fifth Republic has revolutionized politics in Venezuela but has demonstrated that, like the Punto Fijo model (PFM) authors and leaders, Chavistas have also succumb to characteristic systemic political dilemmas of Venezuela. Though the Chavistas and the PFM are ideologically opposed, they are functionally very similar. Instead of implementing a revolutionary change in Venezuelan democracy by presenting a seemingly alternative relief from the PFM, Chavez has merely replaced the elitist partiocracia with a populist version. It is still typically Venezuelan politics by another name. In fact, Chavez’s political upheaval is only a chapter in the on-going political crisis in Venezuela that began over two decades ago.
Since Chavez assumed the role of President there have been, ironically, similar incidences that have demonstrated public frustration with the systemic nature of the Chavez administration. The end of the Honeymoon phase after the 1999 constitution was passed and the subsequent opposition among Chavez loyalists emerged signaling the beginning of further political discord to come. The newest political actor, the Armed Forces, and previously marginalized leftist groups were placed in positions previously held by PFM elites. In addition, the new constitution gave Chavez and the Armed Forces a great deal of power with no means of checks and balances. Furthermore, the utilization of divisive rhetoric agitated racial and class tensions amongst citizens. Chavez’s use of pueblo is a limited nationalist code word that speaks exclusively too the poor sectors of the society and makes the middle and upper classes feel excluded from the national identity.[1] Increased polarization and opposition to Chavez’s administration came after the 49 decrees were passed. The collection of these events led to the Opposition’s failed coup attempt in April of 2002.
The Opposition’s persistence manifested in the oil strike from December 2002 till spring of 2003; their second attempt to oust Chavez from power. It failed, costing the country over $6 billion and gave Chavez the opportunity to exert his power over the heart of the nation’s political and economic system. However; for the first time public discontent had presented itself at such threatening levels that Chavez was forced to implement the Misssiones programs in order to appease the people and regain popular support. The third, and maybe the last attempt to oust Chavez came in the shape of a recall referendum. The Opposition’s failure to present themselves as legitimate political alternative to Chavismo demonstrates the power vacuum in Venezuelan politics as a result. The power vacuum typical of the Puntofijismo has been exacerbated with the consolidation of Chavez’s unchallenged power via the armed forces, National Assembly, and the state-owned oil company PDVSA.
A critical source of the decline of the PFM has already manifested itself with the lack political diversity and alternative options. What is important to consider now is how and when the paradigmatic shift will manifest. The breakdown of the Chavista political model is inevitable despite the new characteristics of his power because they are subordinate to the same problems. In addition to the historic episodes that contributed to the decline of the PFM there were also systemic characteristics that further lessened its credibility. I am unsure when Chavez’s tenure will end, democratically or not; but I am certain that while his leadership seems popular and well supported his placement is more tenuous because of the mistakes he has failed to learn from the PFM.
For example, the power vacuum created by AD and COPEI was due to their policy of exclusion.[2] Political decisions were negotiated behind closed doors among leaders of AD and COPEI excluding smaller and marginal political actors from the political system.[3] Even though the PFM created a policy of “proportional representation” for these groups it was a gesture of appeasement.[4] Members of the far-left were given a legitimate “place” in exchange for party loyalty and an end to guerilla insurgency.[5] The lack of political elasticity in conjunction with poor domestic policy contributed to declining public confidence in the capabilities of AD and COPEI leadership. It also created a power vacuum because no candidates were given opportunity to present an alternative outside of the PFM. Arguably the election of Caldera, set a precedent for Chavez, and was the first indication that not only could Venezuelans vote for someone outside the PFM but also win. But the lack of a strong alternative provided for a vacuum that Chavez was able to fill later on anyway.
Ironically, Chavez has composed a system that has created the same climate.
Like the PFM, Chavistas demonstrate little tolerance of external criticism and even less from rivals or opposition. Even though smaller and marginal political parties had representation in the PFM congressional structure, there is virtually none in the current National Assembly. Nor is there a policy of “proportional representation.” But even worse is that there is no party system. There are Chavistas and those who do not support Chavez. The collapse of the traditional party system and the emergence of a power vacuum has created a bipolar political arrangement composed of Chavistas and the Opposition, a loose conglomerate of the remnants of the political parties of the past and marginalized groups. The simplification of these two political factions has contributed to a paralyzing state of polarization. I reluctantly refer to the non-Chavistas as the Opposition because it is important to recognize that there is a moderate minority that support neither the Opposition nor Chavistas. In fact it is this generalization and oversimplification that contributes to the power vacuum in Venezuela. Increasing polarization has been exacerbated by the power vacuum and the inability of an alternative or moderate voice to manifest and be heard. Moreover, Chavez’s successful alienation of the shrinking middle class will undoubtedly be one of his greatest mistakes seeing as how they are central to the political, economic, and social health of the nation.[6]
Another problematic characteristic of the PFM that has manifest in Chavez’s administration is the institutionalization of Chavismo. While the Movement of the Fifth Republic is a political party, its members and those supportive of Chavez are affectionately referred to as Chavistas. The identification of oneself as a Chavista and voting for Chavez has helped contribute to and exacerbate polarization in Venezuela. Moreover, with the increasing incorporation of loyal Chavistas of the Armed Forces into the government bureaucracy Chavismo has become a well institutionalized element of the public sectors. Like the PFM, Chavismo risks the threat of also becoming “over-institutionalized.”[7]
Third, the PFM exacerbated the effects of Dutch Disease by preventing the investment and development of industries outside of oil production. Similiarly, Chavez has yet to present or implement domestic policies that will diversify Venezuela’s economy and divert dependence away from the petroleum industry. The new PdVSA may be more Venezolano by means of ownership but the structural nature of the organization still perpetuates the problems of the petro-state.
The symbolic re-appropriation of the national oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. during the national oil strike in 2003 signaled the beginning of a new era. The firing of Opposition allied PdVSA workers was a historically symbolic gesture because it signified a departure from the past; the last frontier in the changing of the guard from the old Punto Fijo model to the new Bolivarian Venezuela and the opportunity to effectively repeal the policies of the Apertura process. Through the Full Sovereignty over Oil program President Chavez and Minister Rafael Ramirez seek to restore national control over Venezuela’s natural resources by giving the state greater jurisdiction over the operations and profits from oil production. Oil revenues, which have traditionally funded a large percentage of the state bureaucracy, have been assigned to funds supporting social initiatives like the Misiones projects. The irony of the policies for nueva PdVSA is that even though they signal a change with the past they still foster the rent-seeking behavior and corrupt climate that was characteristic of the old PdVSA and perpetuate the problems associated with the Petro-State.
In the end, even though Chavez has re-appropriated the jurisdiction of control over the production of oil, PdVSA is still a holding company; the foreign affiliates are still intact. [8]
The irony is that the Sovereignty policies have made Venezuela just as dependent on foreign oil companies, if not more so, because without them there wouldn’t be sufficient human capital to sustain production. In addition, Venezuela’s economy is based on single-path development. Outside of petroleum, there are no other thriving industries; in over 50 years policymakers have yet to diversify their economy. Most basic products—milk and meat-- are expensive because they are imported. Yet, Venezuelans spend beyond their means because they have yet to overcome the perception that they are a wealthy state; even when 80% of the population is poor. The Chavez government has yet to radically reduce poverty and provide the poor with viable and marketable skills to attract industry through foreign direct investment. With the increase in government access to oil revenue, comes increased dependence on oil revenue contributing to further economic decline. The state’s autonomy and discretionary use of funds begets the same rentilistic behavior and corruption that plagued PdVSA in the past. Arguably the Chavistas have simply replaced the Aperturistas at PdVSA.
For Chavez to truly revolutionize PdVSA he will need to overcome oil dependence by
diversifying the economy and increasing the state’s revenues from income tax. Moreover, the effects of such reform would take a great deal of time to manifest and take effect. Despite Chavez’s populist rhetoric and promises for a 21st century socialist model he has yet to aggressively implement reforms to address the overwhelming majority of Venezuelans living in poverty. This is not only due to obstacles of polarization but the limitations of democracy and time. Similiarly, Chavez’s predecessors Caldera and leaders of the PFM failed to aggressively do so and paid the consequences.
In addition, Chavez has maintained the nation’s dependency on oil, as did the PFM. The nation’s oil industry is still too central a force in Venezuelan politics mainly because it is so intimately connected to national identity and the only true source of revenue. Moreover, because patriotic conceptions of wealth and wealth distribution are based upon the revenue from production it is a political tool that has yet to loose its public appeal. Unfortunately, problems of corruption and rent-seeking proliferate throughout the public and private sectors in both political models as a result.
In addition to the above mentioned systemic dilemmas to Chavismo there are three impediments to Chavez realizing his political ambitions for Venezuela. First, while Chavez has managed to elongate presidential terms he is still limited. So few years are not nearly enough time for the potential success of his reforms to be realized and further sustain the support of his constituents. Such change takes years, decades, maybe even generations. Sadly, his policies will require patience and continuity, and for a nation in a region known for political instability because of economic inequality it is unclear if the masses will have the foresight to see them through. He will have to further consolidate his power and authority in order to carry out his policies with least resistance.
Secondly, within the context of limited presidential terms he must maximize oil revenue profits by turning out effective and long-lasting poverty reducing and economic programs. However; these plans are dependent upon the volatile international market economy. Considering the government’s dependence on oil revenue it is unsettling to think of the implications should oil prices suddenly take a dive. Furthermore, with internal tensions at OPEC, their future is uncertain as an organization. While his reforms seem to bring light of the problem of oil dependency by diversifying the economy, ironically the initiation of these programs is still dependent on oil revenue. Moreover, Chavez’s ambitions are based on the assumption that he will be in power long enough to see the manifestation of his plans or that future leadership will continue with his plans.
Third, his presidentialist style of leadership is not just a reflection of his military training and political mindset but also the threats to his power. A president with an almost 100% majority in the National Assembly would not need to further consolidate power unless there were still imminent threats to his tenure. While one could argue that the coup d’etat in April 2002 was the inspiration it in fact is not. The consolidation of his power began with the ratification of the new constitution in 1999. Increased consolidation came about by default via various failures by the Opposition.
Just as the clientelism of the Punto Fijo model lead to a decline in voter confidence and citizen participation, Chavismo is showing signs of the same pattern. Arguably the Punto Fijo Model and its actors have merely been replaced by Chavistas, Venezuelans that follow a different ideology but engage in the same rent-seeking and corrupt behavior. Only time will reveal these patterns and bolster resentment and desire for change among the majority of Chavistas and all of Venezuela. Unless Chavez makes concessions and implements policy to overcome systemic problems endemic to the Venezuelan political system he will be like his predecessors and fail to see his Bolivarian dream through.
[1] Lander, 2005. P.33.
[2] Steve Ellner, “Introduction: The Search for Explanation”, in Steve Ellner and David Hellinger (eds.) Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era (2003) P. 12
[3] Ellner, (2003) P. 12.
[4] Ellner, (2003) P. 13.
[5] Ellner, (2003) P. 13.
[6] Daniel Hellinger, “Political Overview: The Breakdown of Puntofijismo and the Rise of Chavismo”, in Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era (2003). P. 50.
[7] Ellner, (2003) P. 12
[8] Mommer, P. 142.
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