Thursday, August 28, 2008

Don't call me a democrat

This historic presidential election has left me with a great sense of irony. Though it is historically significant because of Senators Obama and Clinton's participation, I feel grave disappointment. While voter registration has increased in record numbers, I have become ever more disapproving of the status quo democratic process. And when Obama was named the Democratic presidential candidate, I felt a sense of tremendous defeat and cynicism.

Obama's romanticism has never inspired nor roused me. His on-screen charisma and photogenic charm are but eye candy for a retinal-minded America. The rhythm of his cadence may harken back to the Negro leaders of old, but he's no Martin.

The truth is Obama is an idealist. And so was I, when I could afford to be so. Senator Obama is undoubtedly bright and very accomplished. And though he has a proven track record to deliver results on a small scale, he has yet to demonstrate that he has the capacity to implement long term policy on a nation-wide level. If Sen. Ted Kennedy, a SENIOR statesmen with GREAT powers, has been fighting for affordable and accessible healthcare for all Americans for over four decades, what hope does Obama have?

Obama is not it. Obama is not the great White hope. He's not even the best candidate.

What America needs is better Americans. Not Obama's that do the work for us; or give us the false hope that we can be. America needs Americans that are more intelligent and further evolved. Not citizens that are easily persuaded by pulling on heart strings or loaded sound bytes. Americans need to stop supporting status quo candidates that spew doublespeak.

Democracy, in truth, is the ultimate representation of the human condition. It will only get better if the people do. And until that time we all have to suffer.

Monday, February 12, 2007

It's all you, baby

I say enough is enough.

The REAL problem with democracy, communism, socialism, and governments in general is the PEOPLE.

That's right, you, me, them, and US.

No more finger pointing at THEM. Turn your finger around and point right at yourself.

PEOPLE are the reasons why governments don't do what they SHOULD.

Look at democracy. We entrust an elite group of chosen people to represent us. This elite group is emboldened with the power to make decisions for the majority, the whole, the people, the US in the U.S.

Human beings, the fabric of democracy is inherently flawed because it is composed of human beings. We the people are flawed and imperfect. We have weaknesses and hang ups; pot bellies and acne; addictions and obsessions; The list is endless. So it should come to no surprise that we have systematically elected quite a few womanizers, slave owners, obsessive compulsives, alcoholics, pot heads, crack addicts, coke addicts, sex addicts, closeted sexual "deviants," hypocrites, pathological liars, racists, and neo-colonialists. If anything, the political elite that we elect is US. We are them. Get it?

Politicians are not OF the people, at least not in the populist sense. They are OF the people in the ways mentioned above; and for the underbelly characteristics of humanity. There aren't too many poor schmucks or regular Joe's voted into office. In fact democracy praises and rewards those that are exceptional--exceptionally rich or talented that is. Democracy doesn't reward average or mediocre. And why should it?

If America were a country of schlumps, would we want our government to be representative of that? Hell no! We would find ourselves that diamond in the ruff and elect him president.

Democracy, as a concept is problematic in and of itself. Not only for reasons mentioned above but also because it is a myth. Smoke and mirrors. Americans believe in democracy because they have to; because it is the foundation of their self-entitled superiority complex. The myth of democracy makes you subscribe to an ideal that people are good, that they inherently want to do good for others; and that they are just. Democracy is an ultra liberal left-wing ideologues wet dream.

For the rest of us, in the real world--those of us who can't afford to be idealists because bills need the rent needs to get paid--exist in democracy. Okay yes, we speak freely, and live free from harm but are getting railroaded by the corporate interests that govern OUR democracy.

This is not a populist battle cry against corporate America, but rather a legitimate complaint based on FACT.

The hard ugly truth is that governments will always be flawed as long as they're composed of people.

Call me a pessimist. Maybe I am not emphasizing or highlighting the high points. But the hell with that, this is about me being consumed with frustration and resentment for the political process. And the irony of this all is that I will be accused of being un-American for not appreciating the very freedoms that allow me to express my frustrations. But isn't that my choice as an American? Isn't freedom, the very freedom granted by democracy, all about choice?

So the hell with all that. This is about a good old fashioned whine. A therapeutic verbal diarrhea of complaints.

My soultions for addressing the problems of democracy are to lobotomize all of Congress. Labor intensive and probably expensive. But this way, Congress will officially be incapable of governing. I also suggest, forced vasectomy of all future male presidents. No explanation neccessary. And then, obligatory psychoanalysis of all government leaders and mandatory drug and alcohol testing.

Okay, so these are lame solutions. I guess I am of the typical liberal persuasion: i talk a lot of game but have very little follow through.

Look, I'm working on it.

But what do you expect?

I'm only human.

Tripping Over Roots: The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela

President Chavez and his public policies are seemingly revolutionary but ironic at best. The current Venezuelan political system as designed by President Chavez and the National Assembly is fated to encounter its demise much like the Punto Fijo Model. The regime change as orchestrated by the Fifth Republic has revolutionized politics in Venezuela but has demonstrated that, like the Punto Fijo model (PFM) authors and leaders, Chavistas have also succumb to characteristic systemic political dilemmas of Venezuela. Though the Chavistas and the PFM are ideologically opposed, they are functionally very similar. Instead of implementing a revolutionary change in Venezuelan democracy by presenting a seemingly alternative relief from the PFM, Chavez has merely replaced the elitist partiocracia with a populist version. It is still typically Venezuelan politics by another name. In fact, Chavez’s political upheaval is only a chapter in the on-going political crisis in Venezuela that began over two decades ago.

Since Chavez assumed the role of President there have been, ironically, similar incidences that have demonstrated public frustration with the systemic nature of the Chavez administration. The end of the Honeymoon phase after the 1999 constitution was passed and the subsequent opposition among Chavez loyalists emerged signaling the beginning of further political discord to come. The newest political actor, the Armed Forces, and previously marginalized leftist groups were placed in positions previously held by PFM elites. In addition, the new constitution gave Chavez and the Armed Forces a great deal of power with no means of checks and balances. Furthermore, the utilization of divisive rhetoric agitated racial and class tensions amongst citizens. Chavez’s use of pueblo is a limited nationalist code word that speaks exclusively too the poor sectors of the society and makes the middle and upper classes feel excluded from the national identity.[1] Increased polarization and opposition to Chavez’s administration came after the 49 decrees were passed. The collection of these events led to the Opposition’s failed coup attempt in April of 2002.

The Opposition’s persistence manifested in the oil strike from December 2002 till spring of 2003; their second attempt to oust Chavez from power. It failed, costing the country over $6 billion and gave Chavez the opportunity to exert his power over the heart of the nation’s political and economic system. However; for the first time public discontent had presented itself at such threatening levels that Chavez was forced to implement the Misssiones programs in order to appease the people and regain popular support. The third, and maybe the last attempt to oust Chavez came in the shape of a recall referendum. The Opposition’s failure to present themselves as legitimate political alternative to Chavismo demonstrates the power vacuum in Venezuelan politics as a result. The power vacuum typical of the Puntofijismo has been exacerbated with the consolidation of Chavez’s unchallenged power via the armed forces, National Assembly, and the state-owned oil company PDVSA.

A critical source of the decline of the PFM has already manifested itself with the lack political diversity and alternative options. What is important to consider now is how and when the paradigmatic shift will manifest. The breakdown of the Chavista political model is inevitable despite the new characteristics of his power because they are subordinate to the same problems. In addition to the historic episodes that contributed to the decline of the PFM there were also systemic characteristics that further lessened its credibility. I am unsure when Chavez’s tenure will end, democratically or not; but I am certain that while his leadership seems popular and well supported his placement is more tenuous because of the mistakes he has failed to learn from the PFM.

For example, the power vacuum created by AD and COPEI was due to their policy of exclusion.[2] Political decisions were negotiated behind closed doors among leaders of AD and COPEI excluding smaller and marginal political actors from the political system.[3] Even though the PFM created a policy of “proportional representation” for these groups it was a gesture of appeasement.[4] Members of the far-left were given a legitimate “place” in exchange for party loyalty and an end to guerilla insurgency.[5] The lack of political elasticity in conjunction with poor domestic policy contributed to declining public confidence in the capabilities of AD and COPEI leadership. It also created a power vacuum because no candidates were given opportunity to present an alternative outside of the PFM. Arguably the election of Caldera, set a precedent for Chavez, and was the first indication that not only could Venezuelans vote for someone outside the PFM but also win. But the lack of a strong alternative provided for a vacuum that Chavez was able to fill later on anyway.

Ironically, Chavez has composed a system that has created the same climate.

Like the PFM, Chavistas demonstrate little tolerance of external criticism and even less from rivals or opposition. Even though smaller and marginal political parties had representation in the PFM congressional structure, there is virtually none in the current National Assembly. Nor is there a policy of “proportional representation.” But even worse is that there is no party system. There are Chavistas and those who do not support Chavez. The collapse of the traditional party system and the emergence of a power vacuum has created a bipolar political arrangement composed of Chavistas and the Opposition, a loose conglomerate of the remnants of the political parties of the past and marginalized groups. The simplification of these two political factions has contributed to a paralyzing state of polarization. I reluctantly refer to the non-Chavistas as the Opposition because it is important to recognize that there is a moderate minority that support neither the Opposition nor Chavistas. In fact it is this generalization and oversimplification that contributes to the power vacuum in Venezuela. Increasing polarization has been exacerbated by the power vacuum and the inability of an alternative or moderate voice to manifest and be heard. Moreover, Chavez’s successful alienation of the shrinking middle class will undoubtedly be one of his greatest mistakes seeing as how they are central to the political, economic, and social health of the nation.[6]

Another problematic characteristic of the PFM that has manifest in Chavez’s administration is the institutionalization of Chavismo. While the Movement of the Fifth Republic is a political party, its members and those supportive of Chavez are affectionately referred to as Chavistas. The identification of oneself as a Chavista and voting for Chavez has helped contribute to and exacerbate polarization in Venezuela. Moreover, with the increasing incorporation of loyal Chavistas of the Armed Forces into the government bureaucracy Chavismo has become a well institutionalized element of the public sectors. Like the PFM, Chavismo risks the threat of also becoming “over-institutionalized.”[7]

Third, the PFM exacerbated the effects of Dutch Disease by preventing the investment and development of industries outside of oil production. Similiarly, Chavez has yet to present or implement domestic policies that will diversify Venezuela’s economy and divert dependence away from the petroleum industry. The new PdVSA may be more Venezolano by means of ownership but the structural nature of the organization still perpetuates the problems of the petro-state.

The symbolic re-appropriation of the national oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. during the national oil strike in 2003 signaled the beginning of a new era. The firing of Opposition allied PdVSA workers was a historically symbolic gesture because it signified a departure from the past; the last frontier in the changing of the guard from the old Punto Fijo model to the new Bolivarian Venezuela and the opportunity to effectively repeal the policies of the Apertura process. Through the Full Sovereignty over Oil program President Chavez and Minister Rafael Ramirez seek to restore national control over Venezuela’s natural resources by giving the state greater jurisdiction over the operations and profits from oil production. Oil revenues, which have traditionally funded a large percentage of the state bureaucracy, have been assigned to funds supporting social initiatives like the Misiones projects. The irony of the policies for nueva PdVSA is that even though they signal a change with the past they still foster the rent-seeking behavior and corrupt climate that was characteristic of the old PdVSA and perpetuate the problems associated with the Petro-State.

In the end, even though Chavez has re-appropriated the jurisdiction of control over the production of oil, PdVSA is still a holding company; the foreign affiliates are still intact. [8]

The irony is that the Sovereignty policies have made Venezuela just as dependent on foreign oil companies, if not more so, because without them there wouldn’t be sufficient human capital to sustain production. In addition, Venezuela’s economy is based on single-path development. Outside of petroleum, there are no other thriving industries; in over 50 years policymakers have yet to diversify their economy. Most basic products—milk and meat-- are expensive because they are imported. Yet, Venezuelans spend beyond their means because they have yet to overcome the perception that they are a wealthy state; even when 80% of the population is poor. The Chavez government has yet to radically reduce poverty and provide the poor with viable and marketable skills to attract industry through foreign direct investment. With the increase in government access to oil revenue, comes increased dependence on oil revenue contributing to further economic decline. The state’s autonomy and discretionary use of funds begets the same rentilistic behavior and corruption that plagued PdVSA in the past. Arguably the Chavistas have simply replaced the Aperturistas at PdVSA.

For Chavez to truly revolutionize PdVSA he will need to overcome oil dependence by

diversifying the economy and increasing the state’s revenues from income tax. Moreover, the effects of such reform would take a great deal of time to manifest and take effect. Despite Chavez’s populist rhetoric and promises for a 21st century socialist model he has yet to aggressively implement reforms to address the overwhelming majority of Venezuelans living in poverty. This is not only due to obstacles of polarization but the limitations of democracy and time. Similiarly, Chavez’s predecessors Caldera and leaders of the PFM failed to aggressively do so and paid the consequences.

In addition, Chavez has maintained the nation’s dependency on oil, as did the PFM. The nation’s oil industry is still too central a force in Venezuelan politics mainly because it is so intimately connected to national identity and the only true source of revenue. Moreover, because patriotic conceptions of wealth and wealth distribution are based upon the revenue from production it is a political tool that has yet to loose its public appeal. Unfortunately, problems of corruption and rent-seeking proliferate throughout the public and private sectors in both political models as a result.

In addition to the above mentioned systemic dilemmas to Chavismo there are three impediments to Chavez realizing his political ambitions for Venezuela. First, while Chavez has managed to elongate presidential terms he is still limited. So few years are not nearly enough time for the potential success of his reforms to be realized and further sustain the support of his constituents. Such change takes years, decades, maybe even generations. Sadly, his policies will require patience and continuity, and for a nation in a region known for political instability because of economic inequality it is unclear if the masses will have the foresight to see them through. He will have to further consolidate his power and authority in order to carry out his policies with least resistance.

Secondly, within the context of limited presidential terms he must maximize oil revenue profits by turning out effective and long-lasting poverty reducing and economic programs. However; these plans are dependent upon the volatile international market economy. Considering the government’s dependence on oil revenue it is unsettling to think of the implications should oil prices suddenly take a dive. Furthermore, with internal tensions at OPEC, their future is uncertain as an organization. While his reforms seem to bring light of the problem of oil dependency by diversifying the economy, ironically the initiation of these programs is still dependent on oil revenue. Moreover, Chavez’s ambitions are based on the assumption that he will be in power long enough to see the manifestation of his plans or that future leadership will continue with his plans.

Third, his presidentialist style of leadership is not just a reflection of his military training and political mindset but also the threats to his power. A president with an almost 100% majority in the National Assembly would not need to further consolidate power unless there were still imminent threats to his tenure. While one could argue that the coup d’etat in April 2002 was the inspiration it in fact is not. The consolidation of his power began with the ratification of the new constitution in 1999. Increased consolidation came about by default via various failures by the Opposition.

Just as the clientelism of the Punto Fijo model lead to a decline in voter confidence and citizen participation, Chavismo is showing signs of the same pattern. Arguably the Punto Fijo Model and its actors have merely been replaced by Chavistas, Venezuelans that follow a different ideology but engage in the same rent-seeking and corrupt behavior. Only time will reveal these patterns and bolster resentment and desire for change among the majority of Chavistas and all of Venezuela. Unless Chavez makes concessions and implements policy to overcome systemic problems endemic to the Venezuelan political system he will be like his predecessors and fail to see his Bolivarian dream through.



[1] Lander, 2005. P.33.

[2] Steve Ellner, “Introduction: The Search for Explanation”, in Steve Ellner and David Hellinger (eds.) Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era (2003) P. 12

[3] Ellner, (2003) P. 12.

[4] Ellner, (2003) P. 13.

[5] Ellner, (2003) P. 13.

[6] Daniel Hellinger, “Political Overview: The Breakdown of Puntofijismo and the Rise of Chavismo”, in Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era (2003). P. 50.

[7] Ellner, (2003) P. 12

[8] Mommer, P. 142.

Bibliography

Corrales, Javier, “In Search of a Theory of Polarization: Lessons from Venezuela, 1999-

2005,” European Review of Latin America and Carribbean Studies, N. 79, October 2005, P. 105-118.

Ellner, Steve and Daniel Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the Chavéz Era:Class

Polarization, and Conflict. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

Goodman, Louis W., Johanna Mendelson Forman, Moisés Naím, Joseph S.Tulchin, and

Gary Bland (eds.) Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

Lander, Edgardo. “Venezuelan Social Conflict in a Global Context,” Latin American
Perspectives,
I. 141, V. 32, N.2, March 2005. P. 20-38.

Mc Coy, Jennifer and David J. Myers (eds.) The Unraveling of Representative

Democracy in Venezuela (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).

Mc Coy, Jennifer L., Andrés Serbin, William C. Smith, and Andrés Stambouli, (eds.)

Venezuelan Democracy Under Stress (Coral Gables: The North-South Center, University of Miami, 1994).

Mc Coy, Jennifer L., “One Act in an Unfinished Drama,” Journal of Democracy, V.16,

N.1, P.109- 203.

“Cornerstone,” Contact with the New PdVSA, January 2006, N.1. Petroleos de Venezuela,

S.A., Ministry of Energy and Mines. (http://www.pdvsa.pdv.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/1101/35.PDF)

Romero, Anibal, “Rearranging the Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Agony of Democracy

In Venezuela,” Latin American Research Review, V. 32, N. 1, 1997, P. 7-36.

Full Oil Sovereignty: A National,Popular, and Revolutionary Oil Policy, Serie 1.

Petroleos de Venezuela, Socios Anonimos, Ministry of Energy and Mines, May 2006. (http://www.pdvsa.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/1413/61.PDF)

“Model for Mixed Companies,” Contact with the New PdVSA, March 2006, N.5, Petroleos de

Venezuela, S.A., Ministry of Energy and Mines. (http://www.pdvsa.pdv.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/1421/62.PDF)

“PetroCaribe: Integration in Motion,” The New PdVSA Contact, July 2005, N. 1,

Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., Ministry of Energy and Mines, (http://www.pdvsa.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/935/21.PDF).

The New PdVSA: Sowing the Oil for Greater Dependency

The symbolic re-appropriation of the national oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. during the national oil strike in 2003 signaled the beginning of a new era. The firing of Opposition allied PdVSA workers was a historically symbolic gesture because it signified a departure from the past; the last frontier in the changing of the guard from the old Punto Fijo model to the new Bolivarian Venezuela and the opportunity to effectively repeal the policies of the Apertura process. Through the Full Sovereignty over Oil program President Chavez and Minister Rafael Ramirez seek to restore national control over Venezuela’s natural resources by giving the state greater jurisdiction over the operations and profits from oil production. Oil revenues, which have traditionally funded a large percentage of the state bureaucracy, have been assigned to funds supporting social initiatives like the Misiones projects. The irony of the policies for nueva PdVSA is that even though they signal a change with the past they still foster the rent-seeking behavior and corrupt climate that was characteristic of the old PdVSA and perpetuate the problems associated with the Petro-State.

Since PdVSA was established in 1976, it never completely assumed the “identity” of a national oil company. That is to say, management was under the influence of the ethos of international oil companies and resented the squandering of oil revenue on disastrous government programs initiated by President Carlos Andres Pérez. Congress had passed a law giving Pérez autonomy over spending in order to pursue his vision of “Greater Venezuela,” which initiated the country’s economic decline.[1] In response, PdVSA initiated the Internationalization policy as a way to protect revenue from the spending whims of the state.

In 1983, faced with the fallout from the oil shocks, production cuts, and a currency crisis the leadership at PdVSA refused to invest the money in Venezuela and instead spent profits abroad. That same year Venezuela bought into a German refinery for light crude.[2] There was no accountability or checks and balances on PdVSA’s spending by Congress or the President. Even when the policy of discounted “transfer” prices was implemented, PdVSA profits were shifted away from the state. Objections were made, but President Lusinchi defended the practice and further allowed PdVSA to set its own prices. [3] This gave PdVSA license to establish Citgo, it’s retail outlet in the United States, and invest in an extensive fleet of refineries in Texas, Louisiana and New Jersey. After signing long term supply contracts with foreign affiliates and agreements that effectively transferred profits abroad it was no surprise that by 1990 PdVSA was on the way to privatization. This is how PdVSA became a “state within a state.”

The Ministry of Energy and Mines lost the ability to monitor the levels of production as PdVSA surpassed its OPEC quota. Oil from the Orinoco fields was classified as outside the OPEC definition of crude oil because it was bitumen and not included in quota assessments.[4] In addition, PdVSA bypassed the quotas established by OPEC measuring production at the refinery gates rather than at fields, as is the industry standard, keeping barrel prices low.[5] Therefore, not only was there an indiscriminate amount of oil being sold at lower levels of taxation, that was not included in the OPEC quota, but due to the contract agreements the state was actually paying out and thereby losing money. As a result, PdVSA established a multidimensional hegemony over the nation’s oil production. Authors of the Apertura, or the “opening process,” were strong advocates of Neo-liberalism and hoped that continued defiance of the OPEC mandate would incite conflict and resulted in Venezuela’s resignation from the organization.

By 1989, the combination of PdVSA’s internationalization policy, government overspending despite the lack of funds, the absence of much needed economic reform, and an increasing currency crisis, Venezuela was ripe for financial and political collapse. The Punto-Fijo leadership over the last two decades had refused to accommodate the changing needs in the economy as a result of the oil shocks and the policies of PdVSA. Successive governments increased state spending despite rising inflation, unemployment, and poverty. The middle class was being squeezed out of the crippling system. Inherent in the nearly twenty years of denial was the perception that Venezuela was rich because of the nation’s vast oil and gas reserves; but what people failed to realize was that the oil wealth, due to internationalization, was not in Venezuela. Accepting the harsh reality that Venezuela was in financial crisis wouldn’t compare with the shock of the price hikes that led to the Caracazo in February of 1989.

When Pérez was re-elected, he was confronted with a very different country from fifteen years before and he adopted policies suggested by the IMF and World Bank.[6] Pérez charged PdVSA with managing the opening of the oil industry to foreign investment.[7] In true PdVSA fashion, Pérez agreed to lower royalties and taxes in order to attract more foreign investment and cut high-taxed production.[8] To increase momentum towards privatization, PdVSA appointed itself as a pseudo-leasing agent between the state and foreign oil companies by providing financial guarantees against state posturing and subjected disputes to international arbitration.[9] Rising domestic tensions and the impending doom of the punto-fijo model was the ideal distraction to enable the passing of favorable legislation for PdVSA and foreign investors: PdVSA was granted a decrease in taxation for itself, the export levy of 1970 was abolished by 1996, and the state was receiving nearly fifty percent less in revenue from oil production.[10]

Once Chavez won the election in 1998, the momentum towards privatization came to a screeching halt. Chavez, a former coup leader against the Pérez administration in 1992, was able to take advantage of the political vacuum left by the imploding Punto Fijo system. For more than two decades the elitist policies of PdVSA and Punto Fijistas ignored the 80% of the population living in abject poverty and the soon-to-be extinct middle class. On the wings of nationalist rhetoric and promises of social reforms Chavez landed in Miraflores on a landslide victory. Even though the reform of PdVSA was not an immediate objective, the impact of dealing with the lowest crude prices in thirty-five years caused Chavez and his Minister of Energy and Mines, Rodríguez Araque, to repeal the policies of the ancíen regime and reinvigorate their loyalty to OPEC.[11] Chavez reestablished Venezuela’s commitment to “strengthening national sovereignty over exhaustible natural resources” by adhering to OPEC quotas and increasing royalties and taxes.[12]

After the passing of the 40 decrees, opposition to Chavez began to increase and the media embarked upon an aggressive slander campaign. Faced with increasing polarization and a decline in popularity, Chavez encountered grave challenges after four years in office. The national oil strike, organized by Opposition leaders, was a second attempt at ousting Chavez from power. After three months and a loss of over $10 billion, the Opposition forces failed and provided Chavez with the unexpected opportunity to solidify unprecedented presidential hegemony over PdVSA, to implement the Full Sovereignty over Oil program and defend high oil prices. When Chavez announced that the PdVSA employees who had refused to return to work as part of the national oil strike were permanently released of their services, he had systematically rid the organization of internal opposition to his plans. By the end of the oil strike in 2003 and one year after the coup attempt he had successfully gained power of the Constituent Assembly, the Armed Forces, and PdVSA.

For Chavez, there are three fundamental characteristics to the new policy of PdVSA: first, oil is a characteristic of national identity. In line with Chavez’s nationalist rhetoric and social democracy platform, the reappropriation of profits and majority ownership of the contract agreements, under the new PdVSA, was a defiant gesture against the capitalist undertones of oil extraction by multinational oil companies. At the core of the difference between the Chavista PdVSA and its Apertuirsta past is an ideological difference in the purpose of Venezuela’s national resources. For Chavez, the oil and gas reserves are a characteristic of national identity like arepas or cachapas. PdVSA, under Chavez, was to be a truly “national” oil company, whose profits would benefit the entire population by funding much needed social programs. This was diametrically opposed to the policy of Aperturista PdVSA, because Venezuela’s oil reserves were a commodity to be sold on the open market, not to serve the spending habits of the bureaucracy.

Second, PdVSA is to have majority jurisdiction over Venezuela’s natural resources. The National Assembly passed the new Organic Law of Hydrocarbons in 2001 which established a minimum 30% royalty on oil, an overall increase in taxation, and a reservation for state majority holding in any joint-venture.[13] For Chavez, enforcing quotas established by OPEC and increasing royalties and taxation was crucial to creating revenue for the state because there was/is no tax base. In contrast, the Internationalization agreements were favorable to the foreign oil companies and hostile towards the state; they were symbolic of imperialist policies and anti-nationalism.[14]

The Plan for Sowing the Oil, the long-term vision for the new PdVSA, was initiated in 2005 and has officially reconfigured the nation’s state owned oil company to be the engine of the Chavez revolution. The National Assembly approved the new 20 year Mixed Company agreements with PdVSA that guarantees a minimum of 50% ownership in any of the revised the 32 operating agreements signed between 1992 and 1997 because they are not valid according to the 2001 Organic Hydrocarbons Law.[15] Under these new agreements the state maintains “the principle of tax sovereignty” which translates into 50% income tax on all oil production.[16] This could give PdVSA over 80% of the profits earned. [17] In addition, there is a 3.3% special advantage contribution that goes towards development projects; from that 2.2% goes to the municipal council and the rest to the Endogenous Development Fund.[18]

Third, Chavez wants to diversify consumers of Venezuelan crude and lessen dependence on the US market. So far, even though members of the Chavez and Bush administrations have exchanged harsh words, economic relations remain in tact. In addition, though Chavez would like to increase production to India and China, hoping that their growing populations will usurp the United States as a main client, the distance and lack of adequate transport remain big obstacles. Also, the refineries capable of processing the heavy crude typical of Venezuela are located mainly in the US. So, any plans to cut off ties with the US could not materialize until the following happens: expansion of the Panama Canal, allowing for the passage of larger oil barges that can supply India and China; and the restoration of refineries in Venezuela and the Caribbean that will be able to process the heavy crude from Orinoco and Maracaibo.

In the end, even though Chavez has re-appropriated the jurisdiction of control over the production of oil, PdVSA is still a holding company; the foreign affiliates are still intact. [19]

The irony is that the Sovereignty policies have made Venezuela just as dependent on foreign oil companies, if not more so, because without them there wouldn’t be sufficient human capital to sustain production. In fact, the new policies only exacerbated the problematic characteristics of a petro-state.

Venezuela’s economy is based on single-path development. Outside of petroleum, there are no other thriving industries; in over 50 years policymakers have yet to diversify their economy. Most basic products—milk and meat-- are expensive because they are imported. Yet, Venezuelans spend beyond their means because they have yet to overcome the perception that they are a wealthy state; even when 80% of the population is poor. The Chavez government has yet to radically reduce poverty and provide the poor with viable and marketable skills to attract industry through foreign direct investment. With the increase in government access to oil revenue, comes increased dependence on oil revenue contributing to further economic decline. The state’s autonomy and discretionary use of funds begets the same rentilistic behavior and corruption that plagued PdVSA in the past. Arguably the Chavistas have simply replaced the Aperturistas at PdVSA.

The new PdVSA may be more Venezolano by means of ownership but the structural nature of the organization still perpetuates the problems of the petro-state. For Chavez to truly revolutionize PdVSA he will need to overcome oil dependence by diversifying the economy and increasing the state’s revenues from income tax.

Bibliography

Ellner, Steve and Daniel Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the Chavéz Era:Class

Polarization, and Conflict. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

Mc Coy, Jennifer L., Andrés Serbin, William C. Smith, and Andrés Stambouli, (eds.)

Venezuelan Democracy Under Stress (Coral Gables: The North-South Center, University of Miami, 1994).

“Cornerstone,” Contact with the New PdVSA, January 2006, N.1. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.,

Ministry of Energy and Mines. (http://www.pdvsa.pdv.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/1101/35.PDF)

Full Oil Sovereignty: A National,Popular, and Revolutionary Oil Policy, Serie 1. Petroleos de

Venezuela, Socios Anonimos, Ministry of Energy and Mines, May 2006. (http://www.pdvsa.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/1413/61.PDF)

“Model for Mixed Companies,” Contact with the New PdVSA, March 2006, N.5, Petroleos de

Venezuela, S.A., Ministry of Energy and Mines. (http://www.pdvsa.pdv.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/1421/62.PDF)

“PetroCaribe: Integration in Motion,” The New PdVSA Contact, July 2005, N. 1, Petroleos de

Venezuela, S.A., Ministry of Energy and Mines, (http://www.pdvsa.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/935/21.PDF).


1] Mommer, Bernard. “Subversive Oil,” in Ellner, Steve and Daniel Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan Politics in the Chavéz Era:Class Polarization, and Conflict. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). P. 132.

[2]Ibid., P. 134.

[3] Ibid., P. 134-5.

[4] Ibid., P. 136.

[5] Ibid., P. 135.

[6] Ibid., P. 136.

[7] Ibid., P. 137.

[8] Mommer, P. 137.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., P. 140.

[12] Ibid., P. 139.

[13] Ibid., P. 141.

“PetroCaribe: Integration in Motion,” The New PdVSA Contact, July 2005, N. 1, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., Ministry of Energy and Mines, (http://www.pdvsa.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/935/21.PDF), P. 8.

[14] PdVSA, July 2005. P. 4.

[15] Ibid.

“Cornerstone,” Contact with the New PdVSA, January 2006, N.1. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., Ministry of Energy and Mines. (http://www.pdvsa.pdv.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/1101/35.PDF), , P. 13.

[17]Ibid.

[18] “Model for Mixed Companies,” Contact with the New PdVSA, March 2006, N.5, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., Ministry of Energy and Mines. (http://www.pdvsa.pdv.com/interface.en/database/fichero/publicacion/1421/62.PDF), P. 8.

[19] Mommer, P. 142.

Friday, January 12, 2007

Caracas: A Tale of Two Movies

The documentary The Revolution will not be Televised and feature film Sequestro Express are cinematic illustrations of a polarized contemporary Venezuelan society. For both, the medium of film was chosen precisely because of the assumed impact it would have on public opinion. The two films have been so effective that they have gained an unexpected prestige as part of anyone’s indoctrination into learning about Venezuela or President Chavez. These filmmakers understood that they could make a political film that could accomplish a goal; whether it be to raise awareness or inspire dialogue. And it is clear that regardless of whatever criticisms exist of both films their mere existence has done just that.

The Revolution Will Not be Televised, underwritten by the BBC, Ireland’s RTE, and other European broadcasters, is a documentary done with the intention of doing a portrait of President Hugo Chavez. But after being in Miraflores, by chance during the April 2002 coup attempt the documentary’s focus changed. For this reason, The Revolution Will Not be Televised is often also referred to Chavez: Inside the Coup. The two directors, Donnacha O’Briain and Kim Bartley, both television journalists from Ireland, hold Chavez and his policies in great esteem. Bartley and O’Briain take advantage of Chavez’s charisma and magnetism, showing him at his best as the fiery orator, father figure, sentimentalist, and romantic. Bartley and O’Briain are skilled artisan’s in culminating months of footage into an adoring and revering documentary about Chavez with messianic undertones that portray him as a hero for his fearless defiance of Washington.

The title, The Revolution will not be Televised, is well deserved and refers to the private media’s critical role in the April 11 coup attempt against President Chavez. Aside from winning awards and accolades abroad it has garnered a great deal of support in Venezuela. The Revolution will not be Televised, has been broadcasted on Venezuelan TV numerous times; it is a staple among bootleggers, and was at one time handed out for free by Venezuelan embassies in the New York. The buzz and discussion around the documentary keeps increasing as new audiences far and wide continue to discover it. Though it was intended for an art house audience, it has reached the point of cult film classic in an unexpected way because it is one of the few, if not the only film available by a non-Venezuelan that is pro-Chavez.

Sequestro Express was intended as a film to initiate dialogue on the rising rate of kidnappings in Latin America as a direct result of income inequality and extreme poverty. Jonthan Jakubowicz, writer/director of Sequestro Express, made the film for Venezuelans and their love of Hollywood films. Understanding that Venezuelan films don’t fare well against American imports he tailored made the film to entertain Venezuelan audiences while plugging the political commentary. The nearly two-hour feature follows the “express kidnapping” of an upper middle class couple, Carla and Martin, by four professionals who demand a ransom of $30,000. The use of digital cameras provides an aesthetic and a texture that successfully translates the terror of an “express kidnapping.” It heightens the immediacy and intensity of the cinematic experience. Since most of the film takes place in a car, the sensation of the five characters in an enclosed space acts as a metaphor for the uncomfortable and hostile relations between the rich and poor. As the highest grossing film in the history of Venezuelan cinema, Sequestro Express struck a chord with domestic audiences. At the end of the film he leaves the audience with a message that it is up to the society as a whole to assume the task of resolving these issues, not the government.

Early support from the Chavez administration, while shooting during the national oil strike, suggested that he was on the right track and that it would be well received. [1] Members of Caracas’ law enforcement agencies and underworld provided protection when shooting in Caracas. It would have appeared that the film would get government support but after the film was released, there was a hailstorm of criticism from the Chavez administration and its supporters. Numerous scenes from the film are controversial and have led to a few law suits. The Chavez government has criticized Jakubowicz for including footage from the April 11, 2002 coup attempt that features Rafael Cabriles, a recently deceased Chavez supporter, who was wrongfully accused of shooting at Opposition protesters from Puente Llaguno. Family members of Cabriles brought a case against Jakubowicz for claims equivalent to defamation of character.[2]

The government charges that it may prosecute Jakubowicz with fomenting and glamorizing illegal drug and for the defamation of the integrity of the armed forces and local police because of two scenes in particular: a policeman accepts a bribe with cocaine; and a ranking military officer is engaged in an affair with a homosexual Colombian drug trafficker. Chavez reportedly called for laws condemning such insulting depictions of the military and law enforcement in the future.[3] If convicted he could serve between six to ten years in jail. Consequently, the film has garnered the label of being Anti-Chavista, but Jakubowicz argues that was not the intention at all because he has voted for him in the past.[4] Authorities from the National Autonomous Center of Cinematography (CNAC, www.cnac.org.ve) refused to send it to Cannes or for nomination to the Academy Awards.[5] As a result, he has developed a disdain for Chavez and the policies of his Bolivarian Revolution by declaring, “ninety percent of what he says is right and ninety percent of what he does is wrong.”[6] When interviewed earlier this year about the success of the film and Chavez’s trip to London, Jakubowicz resoponded, “As English people love him so much, I’m campaigning for Chavez to become mayor of London…you’re welcome to him.”[7]

Sequestro Express is supposed to be a terrorizing cinematic experience of an “express kidnapping” as a way to catalyze greater discussion and increase awareness, but this “express” cinematic indoctrination is inherently problematic because it employs simplistic caricatures of social class. Due to artistic liberty and personal interpretation, Sequestro Express has “inadvertently” reinforced social divisions and stereotypes. Jakubowicz presents the four kidnappers as caricatures of the lower classes and even though there is never any mention of Chavez, it is strongly implied that they are Chavistas. The four men are violent and resentful of the rich and therefore given license to be so as a manifestation of class struggle frustrations. The depiction of the kidnappers, the “other” victims of the system, is simply negative; but in truth derogatory.

The film elevates “express kidnappings” from mere criminal act to a tool of social revenge against the rich. Jakubowicz went “Hollywood” and exploited the polarization of Venezuelan society at the expense of character integrity for entertainment value. [8] What is most clear in the film is how he, Jakubowicz—an upper class Venezuelan that has been kidnapped himself—views the popular sectors of Venezuela. The film is in essence a “truth of self-experience.”[9] He claims, “...if you look at the language in which the movie is told, that is the way I perceive my reality during those 45-minutes when I was kidnapped with a gun under my nose.”[10] Originally Jakubowicz was going to make a 20-minute short based on his own 45-minute kidnapping, but when he shared the idea with producer Elizabeth Avellan, she convinced him that the subject matter was perfect for his first feature. The film is not based completely on his experience, but that of his friends who were also fellow victims of express kidnappings. While he seemingly tries to convey the couple and the kidnappers to be victims of a failing socioeconomic system he is not convincing because the “subjective involvement” and “value-judgements” on the class status characters.[11] In addition, the victimization is really one-sided in favor of Carla and Martin rather than the ensemble as a whole. The dialogue is rife with comments and resentments of the disparity between rich and poor in Caracas. For example, Trece, one of the kidnappers, castigates Carla for wearing such an expensive dress in a city like Caracas because its cost could feed several families. The kidnappers constantly reprimand Carla throughout the movie for her status and wealth, as it is demonstrated in her jewelry, attire, and choice of car because it is an affront on the depravity of the poor. Carla declares that it’s not a crime to be rich, and the kidnappers respond by saying it is in a city where half the people are poor and starving.

Jakubowicz makes a weak attempt at giving the characters depth by presenting Budu as a sentimental father who kidnaps rich kids in order to pay for his sick daughter’s medicine.[12] Carla is the daughter of a wealthy doctor and a volunteer at a free clinic and because of this somehow she is to be excluded from the label of just being rich; instead she is rich with a conscience, and our resentment towards her because she is rich should be ameliorated. In fact, she informs the kidnappers of this as a means by which to gain leverage. Instead of inciting sympathy for all of the characters as victims of a failed socioeconomic system, Jakubowicz is unable to do so beyond the dimensions of class resentment.

In retrospect one has to wonder if the overwhelming popularity of the film was also due to the casting of Venezuela’s most popular hip-hop acts as the kidnappers. There is no doubt that the film resonates with issues plaguing the society but Sequestro Express, though it claims to be political is really about entertainment. Also, in a country where 80% of the people are poor what kind of dialogue did he expect to initiate when the kidnappers, the self-appointed spokesmen of the poor, are demonized and the wealthy couple is terrorized? What kind of dialogue did he expect to incite if he was reinforcing class stereotypes and divisions? Jakubowicz believes himself to have fed the audience a cookie with the pill inside, but instead it’s a four layer cake with watered-down pepto bismol. It seems that Jakubowicz set out to make a highly political film without the intention of making a political film because he really does not understand that means. Even though he doesn’t consider himself a political filmmaker, the use of footage from the April 11 coup, street riots, and the gangs in the barrios as a means by which to contextualize the movie is inherently political; especially in the context of the political climate in Venezuela today.[13] He has failed at balancing entertainment and political value by emphasizing one over the other. Criticism that Sequestro Express is another tool of Anti-Chavista cinematic propaganda promoted by the Zionist Hollywood consipiracy has gained greater validity since the film was picked up by Miramax.[14] And seeing as how Jakubowicz is of Jewish heritage, it has only fueled the flames of suspicion.

Ironically, even though Bartley and O’Briain are a little more successful at making a political film they too have a view that falls victim to one-dimensional characterization of the social sectors. At the heart of the drama for both films is the juxtaposition rich and poor, Chavista and Oposicionista. With Caracas as the main stage, both films employ footage of the ranchitos (shantytowns) juxtaposed against a landscape of skyscrapers vividly showing the disparity in wealth setting the tone by which to contextualize modern day Venezuela for the viewer.

In The Revolution Will not be Televised, Chavistas are usually darker skinned and demonstrably of the poor sectors; the Opposition is represented by whiter-skinned and paranoid upper class Venezuelans. The only criticism of the Venezuelan government comes from the Opposition or the US and is therefore deligitimized. Even though the film was originally intended to be a portrait of Chavez, it ends up being a sympathizer’s propaganda film that villainizes the upper classes and the United States. [15] Footage of men throwing rocks at law enforcement eerily brings footage of the second Intifada in Ramallah to mind; Gruesome images of bloody bullet-worn bodies being pulled from the streets in Caracas reminds the viewer of the war in Iraq. Such iconographic imagery is done to venerate the class struggle of the Chavistas, and in turn demonize those who oppose Chavez, because in doing so the message is you are against the popular sectors. It seems that the events of April 11 had a tremendous impact on the filmmakers and they were incapable of critical analysis of the situation.

In addition, the Bartley and O’Briain project the exotica and otherness of Venezuela by beginning the documentary with footage of Venezuelans engaged in a coastal ritual of drums and dancing. It’s as if the filmmakers couldn’t resist introducing the viewer to Venezuela via hot Caribbean rhythms and sensual hip-gyrating dances. The documentary is a much needed alternative view, but it fails to do the class struggle that Chavez represents any justice because of the simplistic characterization of the social sectors; especially that of the poor because juxtaposition of imagery of Chavistas to Opposition followers makes them seem savage and unruly. Moreover, not all Chavistas are poor; nor are Venezuelans who are against Chavez of the Opposition or wealthy and white.

Reviewing Malcolm X, and understanding the impetus to make the film, Spike Lee went through great efforts to portray Malcolm’s complexity because it was meant to inspire greater understanding and interest. Malcolm X wasn’t just about touting the anti-White rhetoric typical of Black national movements or of the Nation of Islam because showing Malcolm in a one-dimensional context would have taken away from the integrity of his character and legacy. Likewise, portraying the Opposition as wealthy brats who have been hogging the oil wealth for over three decades or the Chavistas as populists with a thirst for a war of retribution doesn’t do the political problems that plague Venezuela any justice. The Revolution will not be Televised as a result comes off as a leftist battle cry against the evils of America, neo-liberalism, and neo-imperialism and takes away from the credibility of the concrete political problems. Granted, the first time viewing the film it is easy to assume a Chavista stance because of the obvious slant; the film is relatively accurate and not comprehensive.[16] And even though the film is significant because it shows an alternative view that combats the mass media’s portrayal of Chavez it could’ve been just as successful by providing a complex and more comprehensive analysis of the Venezuelan society and politics.

Unfortunately, Jakubowicz and Bartley and O’Briain rely to heavily on overly simplified representations of class in Venezuela to convey their point. It is unfortunate that with the lack of fair media coverage of Venezuela that the films people encounter most only perpetuate an overly simplified representation of Venezuelan society and politics. Both films have intentions to bring awareness to the problem of economic and social divisions in Venezuela, but in order to do so they reinforce the problem rather than address the root causes of it by relying on simplistic characterizations of Venezuela’s wealthy and popular sectors. It is not enough to consider these works based on what the objective of the project was and if it was successful because the complexity of the issue of social divisions is too over simplified and would therefore fail if measured up against a more demanding list of expectations.

This is not to say that the two films are invalid cinematic statements because of their faults, but compared to other successful models it challenges their legitimacy. For example, Sequestro Express has often been compared to City of God because of the socioeconomic issues that are raised in both films. But City of God is much more successful at balancing entertainment and political point of view because of the complexity of the characters and the humanity of the characters.[17] This is why Missing, as a political film, is very successful. Based on a true story, the message of the film is innate not overt, and the experiences of the characters speak for themselves. The humanity of the characters portrayed is self-evident. Instead, the characters in Sequestro Express and The Revolution Will not be Televised are tools manipulated to promote a political agenda, rather than address the actual politics.

What is unsure is whether Jakubowicz, Bartley and O’Briain predicted that their films would become the cinematic banner for the two respective political camps in Venezuela: Sequestro Express for the cause of the Opposition and The Revolution Will not be Televised for the Chavistas. Chavistas consider Sequestro Express to be an outright criticism of the Chavez administration and The Revolution Will not be Televised has become the unofficial cinematic anthem of the same administration. Their label as political films now is not based on what their original intentions were but rather in how they have been adopted.

Reviewing Sequestro Express and The Revolution Will not be Televised has encouraged me to explore the characteristics of what a political film is. Too broad a definition obviously dilutes the significance of the genre, but then again any film content could be interpreted as political. What is inherently problematic is the medium itself because it leaves space for artistic license; but what elevates a film from the traps of artistic license and political impetus is integrity. Films such as Malcolm X and Missing are the perfect combination of accuracy and complexity, art and politics. Instead of falling victim to bias and political platform, these films are inspiring and successful as political films because of their inherent integrity and universal message. Sequestro Express and The Revolution Will not be Televised fall short of meeting the standards of political films as set by the examples of Malcolm X and Missing, but are significant nonetheless because of the political tools they have consequently become.

Bibliography

Berry, David. “Comment: The political and moral message of Sequestro Express,” Fifth Estate

online. (http://www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/comment/messageofsequestroexpress.html)

Crowdus, Gary and Dan Georgakas (editors), The Cineaste Interviews 2: Filmmakers on the Art

and Politics of the Cinema (Chicago: Lake View Press, 20002).

Forrest, Brian. “Interview with Documentary Filmmakers Kim Bartley and Donnacha O’Brian,”

Venezuela Analysis.com, November 6, 2003, (http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1050)

Gunson, Phil. “Director’s Cut” The Columbia Journalism Review, May/June 2004, P. 59-60.

Johnston, Trevor. “Sequestro Express-Jonathan Jakubowicz,” TimeOut London, June 9, 2006.

(http://www.timeout.com/film/news/1202.html)

King, Michael. “Captive Audience: How a homegrown kidnapping thriller emerged as the most

popular film in Venezuela – and angered the Chavez administration in the process,” The Austin Chronicle, October 21, 2005. (http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/story?oid=oid%3A301932)

O’Keefe, Alice. “The Chavista War on Cinema,” The New Statesman, May 29, 2006. P. 28.

Sawtell, Jeff. “Film Review: Sequestro Express,” PoliticalAffairs.net, September 6, 2006.

(http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3599/1/190)



[1] O’Keefe, Alice. “The Chavista War on Cinema,” The New Statesman, May 29, 2006. P. 28.

[2] Johnston, Trevor. “Sequestro Express-Jonathan Jakubowicz,” TimeOut London, June 9, 2006.

(http://www.timeout.com/film/news/1202.html).

[3] O’Keefe, Alice. “The Chavista War on Cinema,” The New Statesman, May 29, 2006. P. 28.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] King, Michael. “Captive Audience: How a homegrown kidnapping thriller emerged as the most

popular film in Venezuela – and angered the Chavez administration in the process,” The Austin Chronicle, October 21, 2005. (http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/story?oid=oid%3A301932)

[7] O’Keefe, Alice. “The Chavista War on Cinema,” The New Statesman, May 29, 2006. P. 28./ (hurryupharry.bloghouse.net)

[8] Johnston, Trevor. “Sequestro Express-Jonathan Jakubowicz,” TimeOut London, June 9, 2006.

(http://www.timeout.com/film/news/1202.html).

[9] Berry, David. “Comment: The political and moral message of Sequestro Express,” Fifth Estate

online. (http://www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/comment/messageofsequestroexpress.html).

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Sawtell, Jeff. “Film Review: Sequestro Express,” PoliticalAffairs.net, September 6, 2006.

(http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3599/1/190).

[13] King, Michael. “Captive Audience: How a homegrown kidnapping thriller emerged as the most popular film in Venezuela – and angered the Chavez administration in the process,” The Austin Chronicle, October 21, 2005.

(http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/story?oid=oid%3A301932)

[14] Berry, David. “Comment: The political and moral message of Sequestro Express,” Fifth Estate

online. (http://www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/comment/messageofsequestroexpress.html).

[15] Forrest, Brian. “Interview with Documentary Filmmakers Kim Bartley and Donnacha O’Brian,”

Venezuela Analysis.com, November 6, 2003, (http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1050).

[16] Gunson, Phil. “Director’s Cut” The Columbia Journalism Review, May/June 2004, P. 59-60.

[17] Sawtell, Jeff. “Film Review: Sequestro Express,” PoliticalAffairs.net, September 6, 2006.

(http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3599/1/190)

Saturday, December 16, 2006

Factor this

The Spin Cycle: One Week of GOP-TV with Bill O’Reilly

In case you didn’t know it, the country is at war. And I don’t mean in Iraq or Afghanistan, but right here in America, The U.S. of A. On one side are the secular-progressives (s-p's), those who do not recognize the nobility of America and disdain the role that religion plays in American society. They are the same people that advocate social reforms that mimic the social programs heralded in France and Holland. Their opponents are the traditionalists, those who think America is noble and that the world is better for it. Their natural leader is Bill O’Reilly, the original culture warrior.

He is a native New Yorker who has made his tough “hold no bars” attitude a brand name for prime-time TV talk shows. O’Reilly’s abrasive tone and offensive vocabulary have made him a right-wing populist hero with soaring ratings and a bulging wallet. Though he may have you believe that once The O’Reilly Factor airs that you will enter the “no spin zone,” but you will soon feel dizzy because there is nothing but spin. But this is putting it mildly.

He dedicates most of his hour long program to promoting himself and the ethos of the Republican/Conservative lobby but dare not call it such because there is no spin
allowed on The Factor. Instead he masks the values of the right and re-labels them under his self-defined term—traditionalism. According to his new book Culture Warrior Traditionalists believe in the “basic tenets of Judeo-Christian philosophy and the competitive capitalism that the country was founded on.” He believes that America’s Founding Fathers realized that religion was a necessary defense against anarchy and crime, which is why they encouraged a society “under God.” He makes it seem as if the S-Ps are a totalitarian minority oppressing the traditionalist majority; because after all most Americans are traditionalists. But what does that mean?

After overcoming the painful task of reviewing his book, I noticed that there are no end notes, footnotes or references. It’s as if we are supposed to take his word on the validity and accuracy of his sources. And considering his reputation and that of the FNC one has to be curious. On The Factor he rarely cites his sources for statistics. But according to him, most Americans agree with O’Reilly’s traditionalist values and proves it by praising the high ratings, and FOXNews' number one status as the most watched cable news source.

It may seem that I am berating the point, but I feel that the combination of alarmist language and divisive ideology is problematic. He quotes statistics that support his views only and he never says from where. O’Reilly only quotes polls specifically if they come from his website daily poll question. It is true that he is not a journalist, he is a commentator but that doesn’t make him unaccountable to the tenets of responsibility and accuracy that should be the foundation of any member of the media community.

Touting himself as a “man of the people” who stands up against the onerous Goliath represented by large corporations, the wealthy, and the “liberal media” he is a TV personality that delivers news according to him; which basically means, if you want to know what really happened seek out other sources. As a warrior fighting the culture war which is most apparent in the media he aggressively outs his contemporaries and colleagues Rather, Jennings, and Cronkite as die hard secular-progressives (s-p’s). Citing these majors as S-Ps, he makes it clear that the majority of media is run and operated by S-P conspirators against the right. He identifies San Francisco as a bastion of S-Ps; the ACLU and people like George Soros and George Lakoff as the leaders of the S-P movement.

As a self-proclaimed media maverick that uses his daily evening program to promote his ideology, religion, political point of view, and lest we not forget his new book Culture Warrior, he gives himself way too much credit. For some one who has two masters degrees you would think that if he were to insist on insulting his guests he would refrain from calling them bigots. How many talk show hosts call their guests bigots? Or rather how many want to call their guests bigots, but don’t? I guess this is why he gets to consider himself a maverick. He has the combative interview style of Chris Mathews from MSNBC, but lacks the sharp wit. His guests seem exhausted and frustrated when they finish an interview because they probably feel like they just got punched in the stomach since he spent about seven minutes verbally assaulting them with his caustic verbiage and derogatory name-calling. No wonder he has high ratings. Watching the O’Reilly Factor is like watching WWF Raw but with out the fake plot lines and blood.

O’Reilly and his “fighting Irish” temper are indicative of the Fox News tone as a whole. Presenting itself as a media underdog fighting against the Goliath of the liberal media; fighting to present news that is “fair and balanced;” fighting its way to the top of the ratings, Fox News is a network at war. It’s almost as if, Fox News is playing to the “Go Get ‘em!” psyche that has plagued Americans since Manifest Destiny.

The FNC’s infamous reputation as GOP-TV is well-earned. The divisive nature and style of the reporting indicative of the Bush Administration and the Bush Doctrine; either you agree or not, either your with us or against us. Either you watch the Fox News Channel (FNC) because you want “fair and balanced” news or you’re watching the other networks that are promoting the liberal/left-wing conspiracy that has taken the media hostage.

Segment lead-ins are posed in the same way as well. The O’Reilly Factor is the worst culprit. Almost all of his segments lead in with a yes/no question. War on Religion? Democratic Shift? America, noble or not? School Overreaction? Terror Hype? Airport Anarchy? OJ despicable? Bad news? Foul Play? Double Standard? Factor Obsessed? Even when he asks his guests a question, they are usually in the yes/no form. Or the guest agrees or disagrees. This is how it is with Bill. It is black and white. Yes or no. You agree or disagree. Traditionalist or Secular-Progressive. Left or Not.

The problem with this line of questioning or posing of issues is that it precludes the perception of depth or multidimensionality. For example, regarding the recent vote by a school board council in San Francisco to ban the Junior ROTC he referred to it as the “Anti-Military City?” segment. First, O’Reilly detests San Francisco as a bastion of far-left radicalism. Furthermore, such posturing sets the tone and gives little room for difference in opinion. The impact of using the term “anti” and “military” is sensational. It is eye catching and intriguing. Or, in another segment that he did regarding the culture war going on between the S-Ps (secular-progressives) and the Traditionalists, the segment was titled, “Is America Noble?.” Even if guests wanted to answer beyond yes or no, Bill would insist that they answer in the yes or no form. There is no gray on the O’Reilly Factor. Only a fence, and either you’re on his side or you’re not.

In addition to using divisive questioning tactics, segments are given alarmist titles. For example, on a segment he did about airport security. It was titled Airport Rebellion? and Airport Anarchy? The words rebellion and anarchy are loaded. These are words used to describe political upheaval and social chaos. Long lines at check-in and crowded airports is not anarchy, its called Christmas and Thanksgiving. Commuters and travelers conveying their disappointment about the decline in airline customer service is not a rebellion. An airport rebellion would be travelers scaling the check-in counter to upgrade themselves to first class; or rushing the security check-in because they don’t want to take their shoes off or throw away their toothpaste. The use of such loaded language heightens the urgency and severity of matters to unnecessary levels. It is very effective marketing and keeps the viewers level of intrigue attentive.

Bill O’Reilly is a talk show host. He is not a journalist, but a commentator. The O’Reilly Factor is not a news source in the same way that maybe Anderson Cooper is. Viewers don’t, or shouldn’t watch The Factor to be abreast of world or domestic affairs. You watch The Factor for Bill, not the news content. Rather the appeal is to see Bill’s take on the news; his spin.

He even refrains from calling himself a Conservative, even though he clearly is, because doing so would “destroy the show’s premise of being TV’s ‘no-spin zone.’” Granted he does attack the left and the right, giving them both a fair punch, but his conservative ethics screams through his new self-titled identity as a traditionalist. But to prove that there aren’t republican undertones to the ideals of the traditionalists he considers Oprah a traditionalist as well.

The O’Reilly Factor is only suited for the Fox News Channel. Even though he berates the point about the liberal media conspiracy and argues that he is his own man, that Murdoch doesn’t own him, where else would Bill be but the Fox News Channel? Al Franken and movies like “Outfoxed” jokingly refer to the FNC as “GOP-TV.” With Roger Ailes and Rupert Murdoch at the helm, it’s a fair punch. Fairness and Accuracy in Media (FAIR) wrote an article in August 2001 referring to Ailes as the most biased man in news.

Ailes, a former political strategist for the Reagan and Bush (senior) administrations, built a reputation on his below-the belt name calling and clever way of coining terms that are catchy. According to an article in the Washington Post, when Ailes was a producer for Rush Limbaugh’s radio show he referred to President Clinton as a “hippie-President” and used terms like “liberal bigots.” Lee Atwater told a Time magazine reporter that Ailes worked at “two speeds—attack and destroy.” The terminology and combative interview style are pervasive throughout the FNC and The O’Reilly Factor; the network has Ailes’ personality written all over it. Even though, it is clear that the FNC is a top down organization with Ailes’ stamp on the news individuals like Brit Hume and Bill O’Reilly are what give the network its flare.

Even though the FNC has beaten out CNN in ratings and viewers they still consider themselves the media underdog because they see the majority of the media as having a left-wing slant. But as a left-leaning slanter I am perplexed as to how they arrived at this conclusion. First of all, it is empirically impossible to have a left-wing media outlet that is owned by a corporation. The two concepts are diametrically ideologically opposed. Most truly left-leaning media outlets are member supported or subsidized by the government, e.g. NPR and Air America. Secondly, media outlets run by corporations are concerned more about profits and shareholders not quality of news and accuracy in reporting. Third, how fair and balanced can a network be when Roger Ailes is the head honcho advocating an “attack and destroy” modus operandi with Brit Hume and O’Reilly as second in command. This is not bias, it is simple math. A man like Ailes that has a bias towards the left can not be fair and accurate. The very same man people praise and congratulate for his campaigning strategy for Reagan and Bush during the 1980s and early 90s. This is not a man who is intellectually capable of being unbiased and fair towards anything that isn’t right.

FAIR studied 19 weeks of Special Report with Brit Hume in 2001. According to the FAIR study 89% of the guests with party affiliations were Republicans. Out of the 92 guests attending Special Report, only eight were women and 6 were people of color, making 91-93% of guests White and or male. Out of the women and people of color on the show an overwhelming majority were either Republican or conservative. As for The O’Reilly Factor out of 37 guests total in one week 60% were White, 51% were White males, 32% White females. 37% of the guests were women, but from that 85 were White, 7% were black, and less than 2% were Asian or Latino. In addition, there was only one Black male guest. Similar to the statistics from Special Report, the majority of the women guests were center-right regardless of their race. Only two of the guests were academics; and one was a devout Catholic from Santa Clara State University in California. Eight guests were print journalists, radio talk show hosts, or fellow FNC employees like Geraldo Rivera. He had nearly 15 lawyers or legal experts on the show, this was mainly due to his coverage of the OJ Simpson interview. All of his guests were Americans.

During the week that I observed the show, there was no coverage of news about events occurring outside of the United States. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were discussed but not reported on. Concerns regarding Iran and Syria were also mentioned but only in regards to the terrorist threat. O’Reilly never spoke of news or issues in Africa, Asia, Latin America or Europe. The majority of the segments covered domestic news: Post-Election Analysis, Immigration, Sports Rage, the OJ Simpson interview on Fox, etc. On two shows, Thursday and Friday 50% of the segment was about the OJ Simpson interview.

The only relatively international issues related segment was the coverage of the Senate Committee Meeting with Sen. Clinton and Sen. McCain and Genereal Abizaid. The news covered was domestic. There were a few “soft” pieces. He covered the Britney Spears divorce in three different segments and analyzed the body language of Rumsfeld and the Clintons to determine what they were really thinking. There is no on-site reporting, the show is done entirely from the studio. Out of the 8 segments he does 4 of them are interviews, discussions, debates, harangues.

Regardless of whether or not you agree with Mr. O’Reilly, between the yelling or sheer aggravation you feel, it is therapeutic in some ironic way. During the one week that I was “forced” to watch The O’Reilly Factor I found myself feeling completely enraged for almost the entire hour. I felt a range of emotions that manifested in wanting to throw furniture, break glass, write hate letters, etc. What had incited such dramatic reactions was the way in which O’Reilly would deliver and present current events.

In true O’Reilly style, it is not enough to compartmentalize his personae or TV program with empirical analysis but to be on “his” level; even if it means you have to take the elevator down 30 floors. It doesn’t do Bill justice if I were to consider his treatment of guests inappropriate unless I too grab some mud and start slinging. There is something to say for his school-yard bully way of assaulting his guests that makes you resent the polite and professional manner of others like Anderson Cooper. The brash verbal beat down that he serves up to his guests and audience is almost like a blue collar battle cry against the white collar and proper networks like CNN; their greatest rival.

It is amazing to me that O’Reilly has not recognized his own hypocrisy and removed himself from public life for eternity in shame. Judging from the amount of despise so many have for him, he will probably take his growing fortune at more than $60 million a year and retire. For someone who heralds his program as straight talk and no spin, while working for a network who’s CEO was a Democratic party contract killer, and proudly admits that the traditional values well represented with analysts like Brit Hume and John Gibson are the reason for the ratings defeat of CNN; it is no wonder that people like Al Franken boil his blood. The Factor just doesn’t hold water. And just because you scrutinize the left and the right doesn’t mean you are fair; it means you are critical. O’Reilly argues with almost every body on his show, no matter their slant. The Factor is in the business of sensational news commentary. It is all about the entertainment value of watching Bill deliver his harangues at guests, not about the coverage of the issues.

As we have seen a decline in viewers of the traditional evening news shows The O’Reilly Factor has a place. As people increasingly get their news from the internet and less from traditional sources, The Factor presents an alternative to the traditional evening news formats pioneered by Cronkite and Murrows. After ten years of being on the air, the FNC has finally trumped the Turner card and become number one. Is the FNC the future of cable news? If it is, there is no hope. But, the fact of the matter is Americans are watching. Secondly, this is America, O’Reilly and the FNC have a rightful place. Even if it means that the news will never be the same again.

Saturday, October 28, 2006

sí, pero no...

The funny thing about Chavez is that he really hasn't done anything revolutionary or socialist. He is just as much of a capitalist and market economist as the US. And ironically, we are greater social democrats than he is. But this is mainly because we have an infrastructure and a historical precedence. His biggest mistake, which is not a crime, is his verbose nature and Anti-Bush rhetoric. Yes, he has ambitions to create a competitive alternative to American political and economic interest. But I have a feeling the Chavez moment may actually implode on itself. Let's consider a few things.

First of all, oil dependent economies are prone to instability--political and economic. It is unwise for him to "wield his oil sword" and grandstand. He is only doing himself and the Venezuelan people a disservice. If we were to implement the Morse theory or model the price of oil will drop eventually. Where will this leave Chavez? In a broke country and a financial crisis on his hands.

Which brings me to my second point. Arguably, while the economy has shown signs of growth and lower unemployment there are other indicators of a potential crisis. Rising housing costs, inflation, illegal immigrants, the mafia, the bloated informal economy, a very young population, and a real lack of tangible improvement.

He has stocked his bureacracy with his own cronies who have mimicked the behavior of the Punto Fijo leadership with traditional clientelismo.

I get the Chavez vision but he needs to do some serious housework.

Third, the military involvement in civilian affairs is also a bad move. It smells of typical egomanical Latin American military behavior.

Perhaps he's waiting for the elections to make further changes.

Perhaps not.

Only time will tell.

Monday, October 02, 2006

Hands Off

So Senator Foley has a drinking problem and a boy-toy fetish. Well, it could be worse. Right? He could've been caught red-handed by Hansen from Dateline or listed on Oprah's pedophile watchdog list.

While major print publications are publishing articles saying that the Democrats see this as an opportunity to turn the tables I can't help but feel like a forgone conclusion. With almost every little Rep./Conservative/White House related scandal the media has responded with talk about the OPPORTUNITY for the Dems to turn it around. They should've been turning it around since the man began to run for office in 2000!! Wake up! Revealing the sad story of some pedophile drunkard republican from south florida is not an opportunity to "turn it around." It is a time to exploit....run all the stories on republicans with drug and alcohol problems, marital problems, gambling problems, make up a problem. This is the time to REMIND the public of all the Republican scandals that have to do with every known man-made vice on the planet. It's called going negative.

It is not enough to demonize the GOP as a party of corporations and rich White dudes. Technically, people in this country still aspire to be the corporate rich dude, so making it seem uncool is silly. But being a rich and greedy corporate dude who is morally shallow with a drug, alcohol, and boy-toy problem now that is something to talk about. Especially for those God-fearing Bible Belt fanatics that have taken over the country. (Yes I did go there!)

Look, the GOP has gotta go down. I am not saying that the Dems are any better. God help them both. But for goodness sake these guys need to leave the White House. They have caused nothing but pain and suffering, death and devastion, and TERROR since they got here. They have made the rich richer and the poor poorer. They are a party of questionable morals and ethics. Which is why I think they are waiting to spring the capture of Bin Laden on the American public at just the right time to try and regain political capital when it is most needed.

I think the Bush Administration and Intelligence agencies know where Bin Laden is and are waiting for the appropriate moment put him on display like a runaway slave. But, if the American public is smart...(god help us)....we should realize that capturing him will do nothing. In fact it will only further inspire fundamentalist terrorism. Duh!


So to Senator Foley I say good luck drying out and keep your hands off!

Thursday, September 21, 2006

what did i say?

In a previous post "Calling the Kettle Black" I
compared Chavez to Oprah and then CNN comes out
with an article titled "Look out Oprah! Chavez
gives Chomsky a boost."

http://money.cnn.com/2006/09/21/news/funny/
chavez_chomsky/index.htm

Copycats!

Chavez at the United Nations General Assembly 61st session, Sept 20 Speech

Hola!

I have included the link to the UN Webcast of Chavez's speech at the GENERAL DEBATE (19-29 September 2006)Statements and Webcast. Make sure the date is for Sept 20. Scroll down to Venezuela.

http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/gastatement20.shtml

Also the below link should get you right to the live webcast.




Enjoy!